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Territory, power and statecraft: understanding English
devolution
Sarah Ayresa , Matthew Flindersb and Mark Sandfordc
ABSTRACT
In recent decades, the devolution of power to subnational regional authorities has formed a key element of what has been
termed the ‘unravelling’ or ‘unbundling’ of the state in many parts of the world. Even in the United Kingdom, with its
distinctive global reputation as a power-hoarding majoritarian democracy, the devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland since 1998 can be located within this broader devolutionary dynamic. In recent years, this process
has focused on ‘the English question’ and a reform agenda that claimed to offer a ‘devolution revolution’. This paper
offers the ﬁrst research-led analysis of the scope, scale and implications of these post-2015 reforms to English
governance. It utilizes Jim Bulpitt’s statecraft approach to explore the changing nature of centre–periphery relationships
within England. The main conclusion has been that a ‘rhetoric–reality gap’ currently exists and a ‘devolution revolution’
has not occurred.
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INTRODUCTION
Over recent decades, many countries have witnessed the
decentralization of state functions in the form of both pol-
itical devolution and administrative deconcentration
(Asthana, 2013). Hooghe et al. (2016), for example, assert
that there has been a global trend towards decentralization.
Of the 52 countries they examined, two-thirds have wit-
nessed an increase in their levels of regional authority.
Such restructuring is viewed by commentators as a response
to a variety of pressures including managing distinct subna-
tional identities and cultures (Tang & Huhe, 2016), miti-
gating economic diversity (Martin, Pike, Tyler, &
Gardiner, 2016), relieving the political and bureaucratic
burden associated with centralization (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
2015), and changing political views on the contribution
of decentralization to achieving economic and social pol-
icies (Hambleton, 2015; Jessop, 2016). In recent years
the UK has witnessed far-reaching devolutionary reforms
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the
introduction of an elected Mayor and Assembly in London
(Flinders, 2009; Sandford, 2016b). And yet the paradox of
these devolutionary measures was that (1) they were intro-
duced within the constitutional parameters of the West-
minster Model; and (2) they were periphery focused in
geographical terms with little obvious thought to how by
far the largest constituent nation of the UK (i.e., England)
might be included. In May 2015, a Conservative govern-
ment was elected with manifesto commitments ‘to devolve
powers and budgets to boost local growth in England’
(Conservative Party, 2015, p. 1). Since then the govern-
ment has rapidly initiated a potentially far-reaching reform
agenda, statutorily underpinned by the Cities and Local
Government Devolution Act 2016.
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the post-
2015 reforms to English governance have transformed
centre–periphery relationships, and whether the approach
of the current Conservative government is markedly differ-
ent to that employed by previous UK governments. It
draws upon the analytical framework and historical lens
developed by Jim Bulpitt in his Territory and Power in the
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United Kingdom (1983). Bulpitt adopted the controversial
position that the study of UK territorial politics had over-
emphasized the role of ideas and ideology, to the detriment
of a far more basic focus on the art of governing and prac-
tical politics – what he called statecraft. Crucially, he sought
to examine territorial relations through a historical analysis
of territorial politics in the UK and from the perspective of
central government. For Bulpitt, territorial politics has
been characterized by the relationship between the ‘centre’
and ‘periphery’. The centre is deﬁned as a ‘political admin-
istrative community of senior ministers and top civil ser-
vants’ and ‘the periphery, or country, was usually, from
the centre’s viewpoint, all other places’ (p. 3). He makes a
distinction between ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’. The
former involve matters that are regarded as primarily the
responsibility of the centre and might include, for example,
macro-economic policy and tax-raising powers. The latter
covers those residual matters that in normal circumstances
could be left to interests on the periphery. Bulpitt argued
that the centre’s operational code is determined primarily
by its desire for autonomy over high politics and the reci-
procal granting of control to the periphery over low politics.
He described the separation of powers between centre/per-
iphery and high/low politics as a ‘Dual Polity’ (p. 3). Much
of what shapes territorial politics could be explained by
challenges to the dual polity equilibrium and the response
of the centre. His framework has great contemporary rel-
evance in that it offers a historically grounded framework
to capture the challenges and changes in centre–periphery
relations in England.
The analysis presented in this paper draws upon the
ﬁndings of three research projects undertaken between
March 2015 and August 2016. The core conclusion is
that English governance sits within a well-established fra-
mework of centre–periphery relationships. Claims regard-
ing the ‘revolutionary’ nature of this agenda are not
therefore sustainable. What is identiﬁed is the emergence
of an increasingly complex institutional landscape across
England, lack of public engagement or public understand-
ing, and even a pushback from local actors as the impli-
cations of the government’s agenda become clearer.
The ﬁndings in this paper draw attention to the impor-
tance of understanding the ‘politics’ shaping the trajectory
of English devolution. The paper makes a distinct contri-
bution to the political science and regional studies literature
in three distinct ways. First, by exploring the codes, strat-
egies and resources employed by key actors to shape Eng-
lish local governance, it provides clarity on the political
imperatives underpinning current devolution reforms.
Second, it offers an intriguing insight into how institutions
actually work and what drives territorial reform in the UK.
Third, it explores how political momentum and control
ebbs and ﬂows in the policy process and why this makes
territorial reform in England so challenging. This contri-
bution has broader international implications for the analy-
sis of territorial politics, multilevel governance and
executive politics.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
provides a brief descriptive account of the evolution of
English devolution policy, which highlights the long-
term absence of any clear constitutional vision. Then it out-
lines Bulpitt’s ‘statecraft approach’ to understanding
centre–periphery relationships and argues that it has
much to offer a contemporary analysis of UK territorial
politics. The third section sets out the paper’s methodo-
logical approach, while the fourth section presents the
empirical analysis, reﬂecting the core themes in Bulpitt’s
thesis: governing codes, political resources and governing
strategies. This supports the core conclusion that the ‘devo-
lution revolution’ should actually be interpreted as a con-
tinuation of the dual polity equilibrium that has
characterized UK territorial politics for at least half a cen-
tury. The ﬁnal section reﬂects upon the broader empirical
and theoretical implications of this argument.
CONTEXT
England has been a landscape of almost permanent admin-
istrative reconﬁguration and rescaling during the second
half of the 20th century (e.g., Banks, 1971; Garside &
Hebbert, 1989; Mawson & Bradbury, 2006). Devolution
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was associated
with identity and democratic representation, and the devo-
lution debate in those areas has been founded upon the cre-
ation of strong subnational institutions with democratic
elections, signiﬁcant policy responsibilities and accepted
status within the unwritten UK constitution. This bot-
tom-up public pressure has been almost entirely absent
within England. Over at least the past 50 years, UK gov-
ernments of various colours have sought to deconcentrate
powers and functions to regional or local tiers of govern-
ment. The Labour governments of the 1960s established
regional economic and planning councils for nine regions
in England. These developed a considerable intelligence
capacity but lacked political and economic clout, eventually
being abolished in 1979 (Hogwood & Keating, 1982).
Under the Margaret Thatcher Conservative governments,
private-sector, geographically focused urban development
corporations were used to catalyze economic development
in deprived urban areas. Spatial scales shifted again in
1992–94 with the creation of nine government ofﬁces for
the English regions to coordinate bids for European
Union funding along with numerous strands of develop-
ment funding from central government.
The Tony Blair and Gordon Brown New Labour gov-
ernments sought to draw together the constitutional/terri-
torial dimension of the ‘English question’, but in practice
their policy was equivocal in its effect. Deputy Prime Min-
ister John Prescott drove the establishment of regional
development agencies (RDAs), alongside expanded gov-
ernment ofﬁces for the regions, and ‘regional chambers’
bringing together local government leaders and regional
stakeholders. The ultimate aim was the introduction of
elected assemblies in the regions of England. However, a
ﬁrst referendum, in the North East, saw an elected body
rejected by a large margin in November 2004, and the pol-
icy was quietly abandoned. In 2007, the ‘regional chambers’
were replaced with ‘local authority leaders’ boards’ (Ayres &
2 Sarah Ayres et al.
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Stafford, 2009), and government policy began to shift
towards city-regions and functional economic areas
(FEAs) (Ward, Deas, Haughton, & Hincks, 2015).
Thus, successive governance ‘solutions’ within England
have been imposed by the centre, and have been driven
purely by an economic/technocratic outlook (Tomaney,
2016). Devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire-
land constituted a break with the practice of ‘power-hoard-
ing majoritarianism’ by the UK central government, but
this remains in place with regard to England (Rees &
Lord, 2013; Richards & Smith, 2015). Since 2010, local
areas have enjoyed greater discretion over the formation
of supra-local governance and partnership arrangements
(Pugalis & Townsend, 2013; Waite, MacLennan, &
O’Sullivan, 2013), but this has not been accompanied by
the transfer of additional power.
The current English devolution policy initially hinted at
a move away from this impasse. It evolved during George
Osborne’s term as Chancellor of the Exchequer (May
2010–July 2016). It eschewed a constitutional approach:
the new policy cast devolution more as a functionally efﬁ-
cient means to achieve agreed policy outcomes. This served
both to challenge local areas to articulate their desired out-
comes instead of entitlements to ‘powers’, and to reassure
central government participants that they would retain
some control when power was devolved (Political Studies
Association (PSA), 2016). The early focus was upon ‘city
deals’, negotiated between the government and local repre-
sentatives of FEAs, twinned with competitive bid-based
funding of speciﬁc development and regeneration projects.
But doubts persisted about the degree to which these
shifted power and responsibility (Pike & O’Brien, 2015).
In response to growing stakeholder and think-tank sup-
port (e.g., City Growth Commission, 2014; Cox, Hender-
son, & Raikes, 2014; Morrin & Blond, 2014), city-deals
were overtaken by a series of ‘devolution deals’. These
began with the Greater Manchester Agreement in Novem-
ber 2014. They have consisted mostly of pan-urban ‘com-
bined authorities’ with directly elected mayors managing a
spread of new powers and programmes (Gains, 2016;
Pike, Coombes, O’Brien, & Tomaney, 2016).
To date, as Table 1 illustrates, a number of other devo-
lution deals have been agreed between central government
and speciﬁc English localities, with six ‘city-region’ mayors
expected to be elected inMay 2017. However, central–local
relations surrounding the process have frequently been
fraught, and a number of deals have collapsed after being
agreed. A deal for the large rural area of East Anglia was
split in two (Cambridgeshire/Peterborough and Norfolk/
Suffolk); several small district councils in Norfolk rejected
the successor deal, and the government withdrew support.
Similar events played out in Greater Lincolnshire, driven in
large part by the requirement for directly elected mayors –
an unofﬁcial deal breaker for the government. One partici-
pant in a successful deal area described the mayoralties as ‘a
price worth paying’ (Lord Peter Smith; House of Lords
Hansard, 22 June 2015, c1412). Areas that sought alterna-
tive governance arrangements for devolution arrangements
simply found that no deal was forthcoming. The then
Chancellor, George Osborne, stated that ‘I will not impose
this model on anyone: but neither will I settle for less’
(Osborne, 2015).
Thus, central preferences were decisive in determining
the structures through which locally devolved powers
were to be exercised. This was allied to opaque and largely
secret deal negotiations, also the subject of considerable cri-
tique (Lyall, Wood, & Bailey, 2015; Prosser, Renwick,
Giovannini, Sandford, & Flinders, 2017; Sandford,
2016b). Participants may have perceived this too as a
price worth paying to obtain new powers, but it stymied
the process in a number of localities. Research has also indi-
cated that the scope of devolution was ﬁrmly limited in
practice by government priorities (Communities and
Local Government Committee, 2016; PSA, 2016; Sand-
ford, 2016b). At the time of writing, the prognosis that
devolution deals provide a successful formula for devolving
power in England is, therefore, under challenge.
The new mayors will take ofﬁce in the context of sig-
niﬁcant cuts to local public spending (Innes & Tetlow,
2015; National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO), 2016), and the
departure of Osborne, architect of the ‘Northern Power-
house’ agenda that provided the backdrop to many deals,
from the government in July 2016. This makes under-
standing the forces underpinning developments in English
governance even more timely, especially in relation to the
territorial dynamics and constitutional forces that may
have (intentionally or unintentionally) been unleashed. As
Tony Wright has argued, constitutional reforms in the
UK are generally not explosive or revolutionary but gener-
ally occur through the gradual widening of initial ‘cracks’ in
policy areas: ‘It is a “crack” that provides space for “wedges”
Table 1. Devolution deals to date.
Devolution deal agreed
Greater Manchester 3 November 2014, 27 February
2015, 8 July 2015, 25 November
2015, 16 March 2016
Shefﬁeld City Region 5 October 2015, 12 December
2014, mayoral election postponed
to 2018
West Yorkshire 18 March 2015
Cornwall 27 July 2015, no elected mayor
North East 23 October 2015 (rejected)
Tees Valley 23 October 2015
West Midlands 17 November 2015
Liverpool City Region 17 November 2015, 16 March
2016
Cambridgeshire/
Peterborough
20 June 2016
Norfolk/Suffolk 20 June 2016 (rejected)
West of England 16 March 2016
Greater Lincolnshire 16 March 2016 (rejected)
Source: Authors’ own.
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that extend [what] has already been achieved’ (Wright,
2004, p. 870).
The question arises whether, after 50 years of impo-
sition of territorial ‘solutions’ on England by central govern-
ment, the latest generation of devolution policy can be a
‘crack’ that leads to more enduring shifts in governing
relationships between English localities and the UK gov-
ernment. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have
seen substantial change in their relations with the UK
centre, culminating in their recognition in statute as perma-
nent institutions (a signiﬁcant, if purely declaratory, devel-
opment). By contrast, analysis of central–local relationships
in England has often been crowded out by updates on the
rapid developments in devolution deals (for a detailed
review, see Sandford, 2016a). In order to move beyond
description, it is necessary to place recent events within a
conceptual and theoretical framework that is historically
attuned to the British political tradition. Thus, the next sec-
tion outlines Bulpitt’s statecraft theory, which is capable of
exploring the embedded politics of devolution in the sense of
the codes, strategies and resources through which new
centre–periphery relationships are negotiated.
THEORY
This section outlines the core elements of Bulpitt’s frame-
work and explains how it can be utilized in relation to
contemporary developments. It also situates Bulpitt within
the broader regional studies literature on English devolu-
tion to demonstrate both its complementarity and capacity
to advance our understanding.
Bulpitt’s framework
Bulpitt’s framework identiﬁes options in relation to govern-
ing codes, political resources and governing strategies, which
can generally be used to identify one of four broad models
of centre–periphery relations. Bulpitt ascribes analytical pri-
macy to ‘the Court’, a small number of individuals that
form the decision-making political elite. As rational actors,
they will be primarily focused on ‘the art of winning elec-
tions and achieving some necessary degree of governing
competence in ofﬁce’ (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 21): that is, state-
craft. Winning elections and displacing blame are the pri-
mary drivers of any decision-making calculation and in
this regard ‘governing codes’ play a crucial role. Governing
codes form a set of relatively coherent principles or rules
underlying policies and policy-related behaviour and ﬁve
were identiﬁed (Table 2).
On resources:
he suggested that a centre aspiring to dominance would seek a
hegemonic unionist culture, a constitution that obstructed
periphery articulation, a bureaucracy with strong territorial
penetration, a mass party system controlled by central poli-
ticians, the economic resources necessary to dispel territorial
deprivation and time to devote to peripheral politics.
(Bradbury, 2006, p. 567)
These resources are elaborated further in Table 3. If one
assumes that the centre is aiming for maximum possible
control of the periphery, Bulpitt suggests that ‘it will
need to possess most (just how many is not clear) of
[these] resources’ (Bulpitt, 1983, p. 63).
In terms of implementing and sustaining a territorial
code, the national government could adopt a ‘hands off’
Table 2. Bulpitt’s codes of territorial management.
Code Content
C1. Central penetration As was minimally necessary to
ensure the ability to maintain law
and order
C2. Local elite
assimilation
Indirect rule through local leaders
who governed on behalf of the
centre in accordance with the
centre’s norms, and within a set of
reasonably clear policy parameters
C3. Central control of
local governments
Which could vary from imposing
legal frameworks, to imposing
policy objectives to creating new
incentives
C4. Organization
mobilization
By which the centre sought to
control local affairs directly by
mobilizing speciﬁc organizations
within the governance network
such as parties, unions,
contractors etc.
C5. Citizen mobilization By which the centre sought to
mobilize the citizens of territorial
communities to give continuous
active support and assistance to
the full range of the centre’s policy
objectives
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Bulpitt (1983).
Table 3. Bulpitt’s classiﬁcation of political resources.
Resources
R1. A hegemonic unionist culture, inﬂuencing peripheral
bureaucrats, political leaders and citizens
R2. A constitution that obstructs, or does not positively assist,
the articulation of peripheral interests
R3. An effective central bureaucratic machine with an
extensive presence on the periphery
R4. A mass party system controlled by politicians at the centre,
which can be used as an instrument to control peripheral
politics
R5. The ability to manage the overall economy so that
peripheral interests rarely perceive any intense degree of
economic deprivation
R6. Sufﬁcient time to devote to peripheral politics so that the
centre is not preoccupied with other affairs
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Bulpitt (1983).
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laissez-faire strategy, which implies ‘an indifference to con-
trol over economic and social responsibilities’ (Bradbury,
2006, p. 567). It might adopt a ‘hands on’ promotional
strategy that necessitates central intervention, but which
can be costly. Finally, an arm’s-length regulatory strategy
involves governing at a distance and may have contractual
characteristics (Table 4). A key issue to note is that differ-
ent sections of the same central government department
often possess different strategic intentions that can change
over time (Ayres & Stafford, 2014). ‘Moreover, the centre
may adopt different strategies in different peripheries, and
the intentions as listed may be designed to produce differ-
ent results’ (Bulpitt, 1983, p. 63).
This mixture of codes, resources and strategies led Bul-
pitt to identify four broad models of centre–periphery
relations (Table 5).
The central autonomy model (M1) seeks to produce a
structure of territorial politics in which the centre is pre-
pared to allow considerable ‘operational autonomy to per-
ipheral governments and political organizations, so long
as they do not challenge its autonomy over matters of
‘High Politics’ (p. 65). This assumes a capacity on behalf
of ‘the Court’ to insulate the centre from peripheral pen-
etration on matters of importance. The capital city bargain-
ing model (M2) suggests more ‘interference in the centre’s
affairs but often in a cooperative fashion and generally
only on issues of interest to the periphery’ (Bradbury,
2006, p. 568). The central authority model (M3) describes
a situation whereby there may be some periphery support
for the centre’s mandate but there is a consistent need for
continuous central assertion in the periphery. Finally, the
coercive power model (M4) involves systematic central inter-
vention and use of threats. However, this model is resource
intensive, unstable and not democratically desirable.
The nature of the speciﬁc relationship or model owed
less, according to Bulpitt, to ideology andmore to pragmatic
politics – or statecraft – and the need to adopt an efﬁcient and
proportional relationship. This was demonstrated through a
historical methodology that identiﬁed several stages of
centre–periphery relations in the UK. Using this framework
Bulpitt provided ‘the long view’ of the UK’s territorial poli-
tics and identiﬁed ‘the central autonomy model’ (Table 5,
M1) as the dominant model of centre–periphery relations
for at least three centuries. British territorial management
was therefore a history of continuity rather than change
based around a ‘dual polity’ whereby the national govern-
ment preferred to concentrate on ‘high politics’. Analyses
of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland through a Bulpit-
tian framework have concluded that the central autonomy
model remains dominant there despite the strength of
devolved powers (Bradbury, 2006; Convery, 2014). Our
Bulpittian analysis continues in this historical and qualitat-
ive vein to look at the political imperatives shaping the most
recent chapter in English territorial governance.
Bulpitt’s contribution to the regional studies
literature on English devolution
Our analysis contributes to ongoing and pertinent debates
in the regional studies literature. Below, we illustrate this by
drawing on a number of recent studies that have particular
signiﬁcance for Bulpitt. These studies are relevant because
they deal directly with territorial management and two key
facets central to the current devolution deal debate, i.e.,
drives to boost economic development and attempts to
reduce spatial disparities. They also highlight the impor-
tance of historical context, the path dependent nature of
territorial management and the centrality of statecraft in
managing centre–periphery relations. The following dis-
cussion explores the connection between our Bulpittian
analysis and this body of work in the regional studies
literature.
Pike et al. (2016), for example, recognize the impor-
tance of historical context and institutional legacies in
shaping pressures for territorial change and continuity. In
their recent analysis of the abolition of RDAs in England
they explore how actors in particular political and economic
contexts shape and negotiate transitions to new territorial
arrangements. Likewise, Rees and Lord (2013) suggest
that the creation of local enterprise partnerships (LEPs)
in city-regional areas in the early 2010s in England was
‘as much about the realpolitik of ﬁnding workable govern-
ance arrangements and consonant political objectives as
they were about uncritically following economic logic’ (p.
684). Like Bulpitt, they recognize the pivotal role of critical
actors at the centre and how politics serve to shape territor-
ial reform over a more evidence-based approach. Their
Table 4. Bulpitt’s governing strategies.
Strategies Characteristics
S1. Hands off Laissez-faire
S2. Hands on Promotional
S3. Arm’s length Regulatory
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Bulpitt (1983).
Table 5. Bulpitt’s models of centre–periphery relationships.
Model Essence
M1. Central autonomy
model
Postulates a centre seeking and
gaining autonomy from peripheral
forces to concentrate on what it
regards as ‘high politics’
M2. Capital city
bargaining model
In which peripheral groups and
governments articulate, defend and
satisfy their interests within the
institutional complex of the centre
M3. Central authority
model
The centre achieves its aims because
peripheral citizens, politicians and
ofﬁcials accept it has a legitimate
right to demand their cooperation
and acquiescence
M4. Coercive power
model
Centre–periphery relations are
characterized by systematic central
intervention and use of threats
Source: Authors’ own, derived from Bulpitt (1983).
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qualitative analysis, based on the views of key insiders,
offers an illuminating account of English territorial reform
from the perspective of those closest to the process.
Pike, Rodriguez-Pose, and Tomaney (2017, p. 47)
‘trace the evolution of thinking about local and regional
development in order to situate current debates in their
sometimes neglected historical context’. While Bulpitt
takes a historical political stance steeped in the British tra-
dition, Pike et al. explore territorial rescaling in a global
context by drawing on international literature on macro-
economic factors, such as global ﬁnancial ﬂows and
agglomeration economies, and the roles of creative individ-
uals and networks in shaping place and territory. They ﬁnd
that, despite calls for a common theoretical language on
local and regional development, there are ‘highly variegated
international practices and experiences’ (p. 47). Martin
et al. (2016) examine English governance by examining
the persistence of spatial inequalities and the challenges
of rebalancing the economy. They do so from a spatial
economic perspective. Like Pike et al. (2017) and Bulpitt,
they also take a historical perspective, examining economic
growth data from 1871 to conclude that spatial economic
imbalances, most notably between the north and south of
England, are deeply rooted in the highly ‘centralized nature
of the national political economy’ (Martin et al., 2016,
p. 342). They conclude that ‘only a bold and radical change
in that political economy – based on a devolution and
decentralization of economic, ﬁnancial and political
power – is called for’ (p. 342). While it is too early to
pass judgement on the eventual impacts of the current
devolution deals, our Bulpittian analysis offers a valuable
insight into whether the Conservative government’s devo-
lution plans represent early evidence of the radical change
that Martin et al. call for in their recent work.
The issue about entrenched UK government positions
and the path-dependent nature of English territorial man-
agement is also identiﬁed by Harrison (2007) and Ether-
ington and Jones (2016). Harrison (2007) explores the
inability of spatial reforms in England to deal with the pro-
blems of rebalancing the UK economy, inequality and
spatial injustice. He concludes that ‘the spatial and scalar
reorganisation of the state from one scale to another – in
this case from the region to the city-region – merely dis-
tracts attention away from the state’s inability to manage
the capitalist tendency for uneven development’ (p. 328).
In a similar vein, Etherington and Jones (2016) explore
the failure of more recent spatial reforms around the devo-
lution deals and localism to deal with spatial inequalities.
Like Harrison, they conclude that ‘failure arises because
of the primacy of a neoliberal-dominated strategy orien-
tated towards the market’ (p. 371). Interestingly, they
draw on notions of governance and metagovernance failure
as important to understanding both the limitations to and
contradictions of devolution and city-region building in
England. They argue that: ‘Metagovernance – the “govern-
ment of governance” through “over-seeing, steering, and
coordinating governance arrangements” (Bell and Hind-
moor, 2009: 11) – has received minimal detailed attention
in urban and regional studies’ (p. 373).
Bulpitt’s focus on statecraft equates to this description of
metagovernance. In his account, the Court seeks to manage
the separation of powers between centre/periphery and
high/low politics by creating what it views as the right
environment or arena for doing business. Below we argue
in detail that the evidence from English devolution deals
backs up Bulpitt’s perspective: but we also argue that
aspects of the evidence point towards a shift in the UK gov-
ernment’s approach to metagovernance. Our detailed
analysis of the UK government’s codes, resources and strat-
egies complements the valuable work of Etherington and
Jones (2016) and advances our understanding of the meta-
governance of English devolution.
This paper offers a detailed Bulpittian analysis of Eng-
lish governance since 2015. It achieves this by deriving
three central research questions (RQs) from Bulpitt’s state-
craft approach:
RQ1. What territorial management code has shaped English
devolution under the current Conservative government?
RQ2. What political resources are being invoked to promote the
governing code?
RQ3. What governing strategies are being pursued to implement
the governing code?
These questions facilitate the presentation of the research
ﬁndings and underpin the core argument: that the post-
2015 devolution reforms should be understood as a con-
tinuation of ‘the central-autonomy model’ (Table 5, M1).
METHODS
The evidence presented in this paper has been collected
through three research projects conducted between
March 2015 and August 2016. Key data and ﬁndings
from across the three datasets were triangulated to ensure
the validity and reliability of the ﬁndings presented. This
involved verifying core observations using data emanating
from all three projects. The ﬁrst project (P1) examined
the role of informal governance on devolution to England’s
cities since May 2010. It included a detailed literature
review, 14 face-to-face interviews in December 2015 and
a focus group involving 18 senior devolution stakeholders
in January 2016. The interviews and focus group involved
senior ﬁgures in (1) central and (2) local government, (3)
prominent think tanks and (4) research bodies (PSA,
2016).
The second project (P2) was an Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC)-funded project that focused
on devolution to two English regions (South Yorkshire
and Hampshire/Isle of Wight). This project received
face-to-face comments from 37 expert witnesses including
ofﬁcials, policy-makers, special advisers, former ministers
and serving politicians from local and central government.
It adopted a comparative case design whereby one ‘pure’
assembly (Assembly North) consisted of 32 members of
the public; and one ‘mixed’ assembly (Assembly South)
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consisted of 23 members of the public and six politicians
(for a full methodological statement and analysis, see
Crick Centre, 2016). The insights from P1 and P2 are
used to inform and substantiate the analysis and argument
offered in this paper. The ﬁnal project (P3) tracked the
devolution deals that were announced (and often amended)
during 2015 and 2016 and also analyzed a vast set of pri-
mary governmental reports, ministerial statements, parlia-
mentary papers, plus ‘grey literature’ from think tanks,
consultants, professional peak organizations etc. This pro-
ject was based within the House of Commons Library and
ensured that the other projects were informed by the very
latest and up-to-date information.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
This section draws upon the data and ﬁndings collected in
the three research programmes discussed in the methods
section, and structures them around the statecraft frame-
work that was the focus of the theory section in order to
delineate the dominant model of centre–periphery relation-
ship and therefore the extent of change.
RQ1. What territorial management code has shaped English
devolution under the current Conservative government?
Findings indicate that the governing code is one of ‘central
control of local governments’ (Table 2, C3) but with
elements of ‘local elite assimilation’ (C2) and weak ‘citizen
mobilization’ (C5). C3 is framed around imposing legal
frameworks, policy objectives or creating new incentives.
In this context the devolution deals are really little more
than a new form of top-down control whereby new incen-
tives are offered (primarily ﬁnancial or related to policy dis-
cretion) within ‘the shadow of hierarchy’. Thus, the text of
the deals will govern the central–local relationship, and sta-
keholders at the focus group (P1) were in agreement that
central government was dictating how this ‘text’ was to
be developed. While senior Department for Communities
and Local Government (DCLG) and HM Treasury ofﬁ-
cials outlined a ‘desire to devolve as much as possible to
local areas’ they also recognized that power and control
was to be ‘granted by central government and not taken
from it’ (P1). A senior ofﬁcial from a think tank suggested
that the guidelines for developing deals ‘were purposefully
vague and light touch to provide the government with
the wriggle room required to seek the outcome they
wanted’ (P1).
Lack of formal or written guidance affords repeated
opportunities for the enforcement of the centre’s norms,
and this has become more systematic in more recent
deals. For instance, the West Midlands deal, signed in
November 2015, states that it will ‘develop a business
case for an innovative pilot to support those who are hard-
est to help. The business case should set out the evidence to
support the proposed pilot, cost and beneﬁts and robust
evaluation plans… ’ (HMTreasury, 2015b, p. 11). A num-
ber of ‘readiness conditions’ are stipulated for the West
Midlands to take on 19+ skills funding, including the
completion of a joint ‘area review process’ and ﬁnalizing
of risk-sharing arrangements. More recently, the three
March 2016 deals include a provision for the authority:
[to] develop a full implementation plan, covering each policy
agreed in this Deal, to be completed ahead of implemen-
tation. This plan will include the timing and proposed
approach for monitoring and evaluation of each policy and
must be approved by the DCLG Accounting Ofﬁcer.
(HM Treasury, 2016, p. 20)
Other elements of this governing code involve a degree of
‘local elite assimilation’ (C2), largely through appointments
to the LEPs that have spearheaded centre–periphery nego-
tiations on the part of localities (NAO, 2016; Pike et al.,
2016). Deal negotiations were generally conducted in
secret between LEP representatives, council leaders and
the government. The publication of the ﬁnal deal was the
ﬁrst point at which most local councillors, stakeholders
and members of the public knew about the agreement
(Blunkett, Flinders, & Prosser, 2016). Indeed, this view
is conﬁrmed by Kenealy (2016, p. 1) who claims that in
the Manchester deal, for example, ‘key decisions were
taken quickly and by a small number of key ofﬁcials’. The
vast majority of interviewees referred to a ‘streamlined
and closed process’ (P1, local government ofﬁcial) whereby
central and local actors could exert strong leadership (Bent-
ley, Pugalis, & Shutt, 2016). Interestingly, the majority of
respondents in P1 research expressed their support for
closed discussions and process-light arrangements. As an
HM Treasury ofﬁcial indicated, ‘something is lost if you
try to standardize process too much. In many instances
informality has afforded stakeholders the right environ-
ment to broker deals for their areas’ (P1).
Members of the public were – unsurprisingly – far less
impressed with a dominant governing code that seemed to
operate through a set of informal, secretive, elite-to-elite
relationships. This was a core ﬁnding of P2 where members
of the citizens’ assemblies overwhelmingly voted in favour
of greater public participation in order to legitimate the
devolutionary processes. More speciﬁcally, when able to
decide and then vote upon the key priorities for the new
devolved governance arrangements ‘public engagement
and transparency’ emerged as a leading issue (Crick Centre,
2016, p. 33). Furthermore the analysis of subsequent rejec-
tions of ‘deals’ by local councils – such as North Somerset,
Gateshead, Erewash, Norwich, Breckland, Great Yar-
mouth etc. – suggests that a concern regarding public
engagement or ‘the missing link in the devolution debate’
(Bailey, Lyall, & Wood, 2015) has eroded conﬁdence in
the reforms (Hammond, 2016). An ofﬁcial from a leading
think tank opined: ‘there is a very real chance that devolu-
tion deals will fall apart at the implementation stage with-
out the commitment from a broader range of stakeholders’
(PI). And yet – paradoxically – a weak strain of ‘citizen
mobilization’ (C5) runs through the government’s plans,
as a commitment to accept a directly elected mayor was
generally a government requirement for the granting of a
deal (HM Treasury, 2015a, p. 1).
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Two other features of the process resonate with Bul-
pitt’s characterization of centre–periphery relations in the
UK. The ﬁrst relates to Bulpitt’s focus on ‘Court politics’
and the small number of key individuals that form the
decision-making political elite. In relation to post-2015
English devolution, the ‘Court’ was very small with the pol-
icy being personally associated with and driven by one per-
son: George Osborne (Ayres, 2017). This might explain
the manner in which several Whitehall departments –
e.g., the departments for Education and Skills and Work
and Pensions – seemed reluctant to engage in devolution-
ary discussions and why negotiations over speciﬁc policy
areas (e.g., housing, pre-16 education etc.) often ended
abruptly. This variation in Whitehall commitment to pol-
icies was a key element of Bulpitt’s analysis as he empha-
sized how different departments may have very different
strategic intentions, and that these may ebb and ﬂow over
time (Pike & O’Brien, 2015).
A second issue relates to ‘blame games’ and ‘blame dis-
placement’, which Bulpitt saw as a key factor in central gov-
ernment’s selection of a governing code. In the context of
far-reaching public sector budget cuts a number of intervie-
wees (P1) and assembly members (P2) viewed the deals as
an attempt to devolve responsibility for making unpopular
cuts to public services. Likewise, a DCLG ofﬁcial outlined
‘the two acid tests for deal proposals are that local areas can
do it cheaper and better than the centre’ (P1). This raises
the question of why local authorities would risk becoming
a lightning rod for centrally imposed public cutbacks in
return for relatively modest ﬁnancial and policy incentives.
The answer can be found in Wright’s (2004) ‘cracks and
wedges’ thesis. Local authority leaders have consistently
suggested that the importance of the deals lays not in
their current initial content but in their potential to evolve
into a quite different relationship in the future. For
example, a recent Localis and Grant Thornton (2015, p.
16) report a local authority ofﬁcial described the devolution
deal process as ‘the most positive negotiating experience
I’ve ever had. The government genuinely tried to do this
in partnership. The civil service is on board… ’. This
view was echoed by a number of local government respon-
dents during interviews (P1 and P2) and the focus group
(P1). English localities were therefore adopting a pragmatic
position based on the realpolitik that (1) local authorities are
under increasing ﬁscal pressure, (2) ‘this was the only deal
on the table’ (local government ofﬁcial, P1) and (3) the
constitutional balance of power and resources lies ﬁrmly
in the hands of the centre.
RQ2. What political resources are being invoked to promote the
governing code?
Evidence suggests that all the resources identiﬁed by Bul-
pitt (Table 3) are still available to the centre in England
(though they have weakened considerably in recent years
in relation to Wales, Northern Ireland and especially Scot-
land). However, they are not being used as assiduously as in
previous eras; and this has opened the door for a weakening
of the central autonomy approach. The resources are exam-
ined in turn.
The existence of a ‘hegemonic unionist culture’ (R1)
seems to have waned (Mitchell, 2002). Political disputes
in England are mostly refracted through traditional party
politics and cleavages of class and economics, not through
territorial claims. But a ‘hegemonic culture’ could also be
interpreted as an acceptance by local areas of the govern-
ment’s narrative of the role and purpose of English devolu-
tion. This lies behind the assumption that local areas
seeking devolution must ‘give the conﬁdence to devolve’
(Localis & Grant Thornton, 2015, p. 32), by demonstrat-
ing how they can deliver improved outcomeswithin the fra-
mework of the government’s approach. A local government
ofﬁcial (P1) described ‘building relationships and assur-
ances with central government as critical to securing a deal’.
Bulpitt’s (1983, p. 63) second requirement is a consti-
tution which ‘does not positively assist the articulation of
peripheral interests’ (Table 3, R2). There are no formal
mechanisms of intergovernmental relations within Eng-
land, and no representative apparatus such as an upper
house of parliament. Local authorities compete with mem-
bers of parliament to articulate local interests and their
inﬂuence is dependent on the quality of their relationship
with Whitehall (Wills, 2016). Thus, the central autonomy
model continues to dominate on paper. But there is evi-
dence that the devolution deal process has constituted a
limited break with this orthodoxy. Local participants
have reported that it is the ﬁrst genuine attempt to transfer
power that they had been involved in (Cox & Hunter,
2015). Central and local government interviewees
described ‘relationships as far more collaborative and less
adversarial than in the past’ (central government ofﬁcial,
P1), and there is evidence of some localities pushing back
against central demands (see below). A senior ofﬁcial
from the Greater Manchester Combined Authority
described their relationship with the centre as based on
‘mutual understanding and shared goals’ (P1), although it
was clear from the focus group that not all localities shared
this positive experience (Henderson, 2015).
The question of a ‘central bureaucratic machine’ (R3) as
a mechanism of governance is more nuanced. A recurring
theme from interviewees in both central and local govern-
ment was a concern that central government lacks the
resources to negotiate and monitor increasing numbers of
devolution deals (P1). This would hinder the functioning
of a central autonomy model, but some local respondents
also saw a lack of central resources as a threat to devolution:
it could affect (1) the quality of central–local negotiations,
(2) the ability to explore more innovative and creative pos-
sibilities, and what one local government respondent
referred to as (3) ‘parity of opportunity if not parity of out-
comes to all areas’ (P1). One view mooted by a number of
interviewees was the need to strengthen the ‘local bureau-
cratic machine’, bringing stronger negotiating partners for
government into being.
The resource of a ‘mass party system’ (R4) is not as
strong as it may appear. The leading devolved areas are
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all Labour dominated, and a number of interviewees com-
mented on their political alliance with a Conservative gov-
ernment. A think tank ofﬁcial (P1) stated that: ‘Labour-led
areas had seen the potential in devolution and were less
inclined to play party politics.’ Finally, ‘managing the econ-
omy so that peripheral interests are protected from econ-
omic deprivation’ (R5) and ‘sufﬁcient time to devote to
peripheral politics’ (R6) have not been utilized to great
effect. The global ﬁnancial crisis and ensuing austerity
measures in the UK have in fact exacerbated concerns
about deprivation, social justice and spatial inequalities in
England.
The following section examines the governing strategies
shaping centre–periphery relations.
RQ3. What governing strategies are being pursued to implement
the governing code?
Research suggests that the governing code is mainly pur-
sued via ‘hands on’ (Table 4, S2) intervention. There was
a perception amongst interviewees (P1) and expert wit-
nesses (P2) that Whitehall has its ‘priority areas to secure
a deal with, whether for political or economic motives’ (aca-
demic interviewee, P2). Indeed, respondents referred to
informal and off-the-record discussions between so-called
Westminster ‘big hitters’ and localities with a view ‘to
knocking heads together to secure a deal’ (central govern-
ment ofﬁcial, P1).
But despite the enduring presence of many tools of con-
trol associated with central autonomy, data also suggest the
beginnings of a shift in central–local relations. Some local
government interviewees reported that government was
‘desperate’ to conclude deals (P1) – contrasting with its
claims that it did not intend to oblige any areas to do so.
Regarding the negotiations themselves, the data suggest
that the government did not hold all the cards. One local
government interviewee reported that a local leader had
been able to extract concessions from the government:
‘she threatened to walk out. She literally had her coat on
and was in the doorway, and they said – all right’ (P1).
Some participants at the focus group (P1) also reported
having successfully ‘pushed back’ the government on a
number of points where initially the government had
refused to consider devolution and on ﬁrming up commit-
ments to delivery within the deal texts. This suggests an
inkling of a long-term relationship with more afﬁnity to
the ‘capital city bargaining model’ (M2), where the
localities negotiate on more equal terms. More recently,
sector representatives have suggested in the media that
devolution is ﬂoundering amidst a loss of momentum in
the centre: this hints again that any move towards this
model would be dependent on central government
intentions.
The mayoral role demonstrates the ambivalence of the
centre’s position. The newly elected mayors may be able
to articulate, defend and satisfy their interests within the
institutional complex of the centre using their democratic
mandate. But the constraints of the deals may require
them to take on the ‘less gratifying functions’ of
government, with little leeway for independent action.
The requirements for monitoring, evaluation, and
implementation plans in the deals suggest that the centre
intends to maintain hands-on control via output targets.
How this translates into practice depends upon two main
factors: whether central government will have the resources
(or the will) to monitor in this way and how far elected
mayors will be able to push back against such control.
This brings us to reﬂect on the wider implications of the
analysis of English regional devolution offered in this
paper.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored recent developments in the gov-
ernance of England. It has achieved this by presenting
the ﬁndings of three interrelated research projects using
Bulpitt’s statecraft approach. The main conclusion has
been that a ‘rhetoric–reality gap’ currently exists and a
‘devolution revolution’ has not occurred. Bulpitt’s ‘central
autonomy model’ remains the dominant mode of central
statecraft and to some extent the recent deals might be
more accurately described not in the language of ‘devolu-
tion’ but as a ‘new partnership’ in centre–periphery
relationships. This ﬁnding demonstrates the continuation
and intensiﬁcation of the transactional approach identiﬁed
by Pike & O’Brien (2015) in their analysis of city deals.
Indeed, this is exactly the interpretation promoted by the
former Conservative Deputy Prime Minister, Lord
Heseltine:
When one talks of devolution it’s not realistic to talk about
freedom. This is a partnership concept. Central government
are elected and they are entitled to have their manifestos
implemented and it cannot be contemplated there is a
sense of freedom at a local level which can actually frustrate
the clear mandates upon which governments are elected.…
I am sympathetic to the word ‘partnership’ rather than ‘free-
dom’ or ‘devolution’.
(Heseltine, 2015, p. 1)
To some extent this conclusion is not surprising and has
been noted elsewhere (Tomaney, 2016). Despite the
hyperbole of politicians rhetoric–reality gaps are far from
uncommon in polities around the world and the British
political tradition is well known for being evolutionary,
organic and conservative. The question is really then one
of what makes these ﬁndings particularly distinctive or of
relevance to political scientists and regional studies scholars
around the world? Three brief responses help to tease out
the broader relevance of the research presented in this
paper. The ﬁrst focuses on the issues of clarity; the second
on how institutions work and the third on policy momen-
tum and control.
At a very basic level one of the most signiﬁcant contri-
butions of this paper has been to offer an accurate, coherent
and up-to-date snapshot on the reform of English local
governance. The importance of mapping the changing
topography of this institutional landscape should not be
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understated given the rather ad-hoc, sporadic and confused
rollout of this agenda to date. The key strength of Bulpitt’s
framework in this context lies in the manner in which it
dissects the underlying strategies and resources of key
actors. The descriptive element of this study has therefore
identiﬁed the emergence of an increasingly complex and
asymmetrical governance framework at the subnational
level.
This leads into a related focus on how institutions work
and what drives reform agendas. The work of George Tse-
belis (Tsebelis, 2002) is particularly relevant in this context
due to the manner in which it develops the concept of veto
players within a legislative context and in relation to speciﬁc
policy areas. A veto player is – put simply – a player in the
political game with the capacity to prevent change from the
status quo. The conceptual value of this approach to under-
standing how institutions work lies in the manner in which
it reveals the existence of embedded but generally unequal
or asymmetrical distributions of power within and between
institutions. Any reform will therefore generally produce
‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This explains the ebb and ﬂow of
reform demands and the role of crises in potentially jolting
systems out of their pre-existing pathways. Bulpitt’s analy-
sis underlines the role of the national government as the key
veto player with the capacity to facilitate or block changes
to the status quo.
The almost embedded obstacle to reform is therefore an
unwillingness amongst those political elites that currently
beneﬁt from the existing status quo to support reforms
that are explicitly designed to shift the balance of power.
In this context comparative political and institutional ana-
lyses have consistently highlighted the importance of two
factors: crises and constitutional entrepreneurs. Crises
open ‘windows of opportunity’ by potentially jolting insti-
tutions or constitutional conﬁgurations out of established
pathways and thereby facilitating the introduction of new
structures and relationships. The opening of a ‘window of
opportunity’ is not on its own enough to guarantee that
an opportunity for change will be taken. Established politi-
cal elites are likely to seek to frame or control the crisis
quickly in such a way that the reform parameters are
reduced and the ‘window’ is quickly closed. In this context
the role of an individual with a personal and explicit com-
mitment to a speciﬁc reform agenda and who has the
capacity to remove ‘executive blockages’ (i.e., a consti-
tutional entrepreneur) is often vital. This account can be
drawn upon to explain failures in the meta-governance of
English devolution. This historical institutionalist account
complement explanations of failure based on the predomi-
nance of a neo-liberal strategy put forward by Etherington
and Jones (2016). This Bulpittian analysis also provides an
in-depth account of the political drivers and constraints
shaping governance reform in England that contributes
to the international literature on understanding the context
speciﬁc factors shaping territorial reform globally (Pike
et al., 2017).
In this instance, a ‘window of opportunity’ was opened
by a constitutional entrepreneur in the form of the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, who was very
clearly personally driving the agenda (Hambleton, 2015;
Ward et al., 2015). In many ways Osborne’s role was to
remove the ‘executive blockages’ that other members of
his government placed in the way of the reform agenda.
The obvious risk of having a policy attached to a consti-
tutional entrepreneur is that if the individual loses their
capacity to shape and control the emerging meta-govern-
ance, as Osborne did when he was not offered a place in
Theresa May’s Conservative government from July 2016
onwards, then the policy agenda may well wither and the
‘window of opportunity’ close.
This brings us to a third and ﬁnal point that highlights
the broader signiﬁcance of recent developments in the
UK – the issue of policy momentum and control. The Brit-
ish constitution is well known for evolving according to
what has become known as the ‘cracks and wedges thesis’
(Wright, 2004). This suggests that change generally occurs
through the imposition of relatively minor concessions in
relation to rules, procedures or relationships which then
provides a wedge that can be used to expand and develop
the initial concession into a more signiﬁcant change over
time. The relevance of this argument for this paper is
that it may well be far too soon to really understand the
implications of recent reforms to English governance.
Elected mayors have the potential to act as ‘wedges’, push-
ing for greater local purchase on policy through the ‘cracks’
afforded by the devolution deals. The interim Mayor for
Greater Manchester, Tony Lloyd, has already described
the devolution deal to Greater Manchester as ‘transforma-
tional’ and over time thismay be true. To make this sugges-
tion is not to undermine the core argument of this paper
regarding the maintenance of a clear ‘central autonomy
model’. And yet looking to the future there is clearly a
strong chance that if the economic, social and democratic
beneﬁts of ‘devolution deals’ begin to be realized then the
centre–periphery model will shift, implying that the gov-
ernment has ceded some control. Stronger English
localities with visible ‘metro mayors’ and greater govern-
ance capacity will, so the theoretical logic and international
experience suggests, move into a position whereby they can
work with government in partnership to broker arrange-
ments that suit their local circumstances. That is, the
‘centre–periphery model’ may evolve more towards Bul-
pitt’s ‘capital city bargaining model’ and the UK’s contin-
ued existence as an international exemplar of a power-
hoarding majoritarian polity may itself have to be
reassessed.
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